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Introduction
Continuation of Colorado’s prosperity obviously requires
water.

Its availability depends on facilitating transfers and

on minimizing waste.1

Happily, Colorado’s current

agricultural usage provides a generous pool from which
underused or wasted water can be drawn.

As of 1980, for

example, agriculture was responsible for 87% of Colorado’s
consumptive water use.2

Fairly trivial savings in the

1 Throughout the paper I conceive of waste in economic
terms, i.e., as "a preventable loss the value of which exceeds
the cost of avoidance."
S. L. MacDonald, Petroleum
Conservation in the United States: An Economic Analysis 129
(1971).
This obviously excludes some water uses that might
fit the colloquial concept of waste.
For example, if water is
thrown upon the sidewalk in the course of watering, it appears
to be wasted; but if the cost of avoiding it -- e.g., the use
of more sprinkler heads, more finely tuned ones — exceeds the
value of the water saved, such a use would not be wasteful
within the economic definition.
The fundamental point is that
all kinds of resources are valuable to a society, so that a
single-minded focus on saving water will make society worse
off.
2 U.S.Geological Survey Circular 1001, Estimated Use of
Water in the United States in 1980 (1983).
The 87% figure
comprises irrigation and other rural fresh-water use (Tables 3
and 5); the remaining 13* comprises public-supplied fresh
water, self-supplied industrial water, and thermoelectric
power consumptive use (Tables 1, 7 and 9).
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agricultural sector could, therefore, provide for a doubling
or tripling of industrial and municipal consumption.

How can

these savings best be brought about?
The current system is, of course, a mix of market and
government control, with the market element probably dominant.
There are quite a few voices raised, however,
increasing the regulatory component,

in favor of

in the form,

for example,

of using the "beneficial use" doctrine to mandate water
saving.

These suggestions seem to me ill-conceived.

The

interest in getting the most value out of our water would best
be served by moving in the opposite direction —

by

diminishing the current fetters on the market.
The arguments for reliance on the market are the familiar
ones.

Above all, the market is an extraordinary system for

generating information.
selling in a market,

Individuals and firms, buying and

generate prices.

with individual ingenuity,

Those prices, coupled

in turn emanl;e people to make

sensible decisions on how much to consume, how much to
produce, and how to go about production.

Thus a wheat farmer

is able to decide how much fertilizer he will use, and of what
types, without knowing anything about how the fertilizer is
made.

But his action in deciding how much to buy (and of

course those of millions of others) give fertilizer
manufacturers critical information about how much they should
produce.

And so on backwards through the productive process.

No government agency could ever pull together the information
needed to make these decisions.
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Before discussing Colorado water law itself,

let me

respond in advance to the most common attack on reliance on
the market in water —
First,

"water is essential to life itself."

if the market is a good instrument for allocating

non-essential resources, one might think that it was all the
more important to use it for allocating an essential one.
Second, quite a few other elements are essential for
life.

Have you ever tried growing wheat without land? (or

even practicing law?)

Yet on the whole we allow the

allocation of land to be market-determined.

(I’ll return to

the comparison in more detail later.)
Third, none of the institutions that we discuss here
today will ever jeopardize —

or even seriously affect -- the

supply of water for the purposes that make us call it
essential.

Somewhere out in the great western desert there

may be a person or two about to expire for want of water, but
that will be because of an extremely local problem —

for

example, he may inadequately prepared for a camping trip or
for a journey across a long barren stretch of road.

In this

discussion, by contrast, we are talking as of water as an
input to agriculture, or to industry, or to non-vital domestic
uses.

Suppose, for example,

the domestic price of water were
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to double.3

Lawns might shrink,

cars might be cleaned less

often (or more efficiently), but no one would die of thirst,
or have to go about dirty, or even have to alter his cooking
methods.
There a great western tradition of proclaiming water
essential —
waste.

and then adopting institutions that guarantee its

We could perhaps do better by simply focussing on the

issue of how to nurture institutions that will diminish waste.
This paper will first try to develop the necessary
criteria for establishing a market that will secure adequate
efficiency in the use of surface water.
the special case of instream uses.

It will then consider

Finally it will address

nontributary groundwater.

3
Of course in the part of Denver without water meters,
the price of water to the user is zero . This is itself a
curious comment on the reluctance of Coloradans to think
seriously about water policy.
There is powerful evidence that
residential users’ consumption is highly responsive to price.
See J. Hirshleifer, J. C. deHaven & J. W. Milliman, Water
Supply: Economics, Technology and Policy 309 (1960); Zach
Willey (Environmental Defense Fund), Economic Development and
Environmental Quality in California’s Water System 35 n. 20
(Institute of Governmental Studies 1985) (hereinafter cited as
EDF Report) (referring to evidence that the price elasticities
of demand are about -0.92 in the urban sector and -0.91 in the
agricultural sector).
A price elasticity of -0.92 means that
a consumer would reduce his consumption 9.2% in response to a
10% increase in price.
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A. Criteria.for.Minimizing.Waste.o f S u r f a c e Water
It is my thesis that waste can be adequately prevented by
giving the holders of water rights conventional market
incentives to avoid waste.

The conditions that would

establish such market incentives are as follows:
1. O w n e r s o f water r i g h t s w i l l n o t waste water if they
bear the cost of such waste.
For purpose s of the above statement, "cost" me an s
"opportunity cost .”
2. Owners of water rights will bear the opportunity cost
of w a s t e i f their.rights.are r e a d i l y transferable.
3. Water r i g h t s m eet t h e above test of ready
transferability.if
a. administrateive/adjudicative costs are kept low;
b . water rights are clearly defined;
c . transfer is restricted o n l y i n t h e i n t e r e s t of
protecting jun i o r appropriators; and
d. t h e adjust m e n t s made i n t h e interest o f protecting
j u n i o r s are t h e m inimu m c o n s i s t e
n
t
w i t h that protection.
This section will elaborate on these criteria.

6

1. Owners of w a t e r r i g h t s w ill no t w a s t e w a t e r i f they
b e a r th e c o s t o f s u c h waste.
For purposes of t h e above statement, "cost” means
"opportun i t y cost.”
Suppose a farmer could save4 1000 acre feet of water
(annually) by means of a device that he can install for $5000.
(To keep matters simple, assume the device has no operating
costs and a perpetual life).

The opportunity cost of not

installing the device is the value of the water saved,
the cost of installation.

less

If the water saved is worth

$20 ,000, then the opportunity cost of the farmer’s inaction —
the farmer’s waste —

is $15,000.

There are various ways of making the farmer "bear" that
cost.

The state could fine him;

taking the water away from him;

it could penalize him by
it could install the device

and insist on payment from the farmer.

None of these methods

is very consistent with our institutions —
dominant institutions.

or at least our

All of them require that the state

snoop around, determine that the particular waste-reduction is
feasible,

and bring the weight of its bureaucracy to bear on

the farmer.
Not only are these methods inconsistent with our
institutions,

they are themselves monstrously inefficient.

How reliable do you think the bureaucrat’s decision —

that it

4
"Save" refers to real savings, i.e., to water
otherwise lost through evapotranspiration. It does not refer
to water that seeps out of a ditch and is put to use by
downstream users.
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is efficient for Farmer A to install such-and-such a device —
will be?
More basically, determination that a particular practice
is wasteful requires some device for valuing the water saved;
unless we know that value, we cannot determine whether the
extra water is worth the expense.

Determining a value for

water essentially requires the existence of a decent water
market to generate prices.5
Defects in the water market drive a wedge between between
a farmer’s and a bureaucrat’s view of sensible water-saving
methods.

The bureaucrat may well value water at its

incremental cost —

the cost of adding new water supplies

through dam building, etc.
per acre foot.

This might amount to, say, $500

But if the farmer is unable to realize that

amount for water that is saved, he will clearly compare the
cost of the savings against a much lower value.

In the

extreme case, where he cannot sell it and he cannot increase
the yield from his land by increasing water use, he would
value the extra water at zero.
For precisely this reason, a recent report for the
Environmental Defense Fund6 takes a fairly skeptical view of
5 In a market individuals and firms create prices by
their conduct — indicating by selling that a particular
quantity of water is, to them, not worth the market price,
indicating by buying that they have a use that they deem at
least as valuable as the market price.
The ongoing pattern of
these exchanges keeps driving the price to a level at which no
further exchanges will provide any benefit; of course new
developments constantly change people’s evaluation of their
own circumstances, so that new transactions, and new price
changes, occur.
6 EDF Report, supra note 3, at 4-5.
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bureaucratic enforcement of the concept of "reasonable and
beneficial use."

It points to a proceeding by the State Water

Resources Control Board in California,

in which the agency was

valuing water at $200 an acre foot (a very conservative
estimate of the cost of new water supplies), while the farmers
in the Imperial Irrigation District were valuing it at the $9
per acre foot that the district paid.

In such a case, the

opposing parties will be talking at cross-purposes,

farmers

will fight enforcement with bitterness and at great cost, and
in all probability only the most egregious of waste will be
ended (if any).

The EDF Report concluded that the episode

...illustrated the difficulty of this approach,

clearly

only second best when compared to the establishment of a
market for water transfers.7
Because of the difficulty of agreeing on values for
purposes of comparing expenses with water saved, a regulatory
system for preventing waste cannot work unless accompanied by
an adequate market.
adequate market,

But, as I hope to show below, with an

there is no need for regulatory intervention.

There is, happily, a way of making the farmer bear the
cost that is entirely consistent with our institutions:
creation of an adequate market in water rights.
market,

With such a

the farmer can quickly recognize that by failing to

install the device, he is foregoing the $20,000 that the water
is worth;

in our example, he is foregoing a net gain of

$15,000.

(To put in in terms of "opportunity cost,” he in

7

Id. at 4.
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incurring an opportunity cost of $15,000.)

That should give

him ample incentive to install the device.
2. O w n e r s of.water.rights will bear.t h e opportunity cost
of w a s t e i f t h e i r r i g h t s a r e r e a d i l y transferable.
With very limited exceptions, the state does not go
around demanding that a landowner apply his or her land to
specific uses.

It imposes limitations on what he may do

(zoning), but it does not affirmatively demand that he do
anything very much.

It does not, for example,

insist that the

owner of any parcel of downtown Denver real estate build on

it.
How is it that the state evidently feels free to allow
urban landowners to "neglect" their land (in the sense of
underusing it, of failing to apply it to a beneficial use)?
Is it because Denver real estate is not very valuable?

Is it

because urban landowners are smart and the owners of water
rights are not?
My answer would be this:

Real property law implicitly

recognizes that the owner of urban real estate is disciplined
by the market.

It assumes that if he fails to apply his

property to the most productive uses, there are plenty of
people out there who can imagine how they might do so, and
that he will sooner or later (probably sooner), see their
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bids.

He can indulge in the luxury of underuse only at the

cost of foregoing those bids.8
While Colorado real property law has developed on the
implicit premise that the land transfer market works well
enough to discipline neglectful landowners,
developed largely on the opposite premise —

its water law has
that the water

rights market cannot adequately discipline neglectful water
rights owners.
Let me offer three samples of Colorado water law
reflecting this more pessimistic premise:
of beneficial use;

(1) the requirement

(2) the doctrine of abandonment;

and (3)

the concept that an appropriator does not ordinarily have a
property interest in the return flow from his use (e.g., he
cannot ordinarily obtain an injunction against a downstream
junior whose use would, under prevailing stream flow
conditions, be impossible without that return flow).
There are a variety of ideas likely to be invoked in
favor of these rules:

First,

it may well be said that they

prevent anyone from being a "dog in the manger."

Second,

they

might be defended on the ground that, since water is a
uniquely precious resource,

the public interest in efficient

water use requires state supervision.

Thus,

in the case of

beneficial use, the public interest requires that no one use

8 Why, then, are there tracts used only as parking lots
in downtown Denver?
They may seem wasteful.
But presumably
the owners of such land hold off development in the belief
that such a course will maximize the present discounted value
of the land.
Incidentally, some of them may be wrong, but,
because they bear the primary cost of any error, we are
willing to rely on their judgment.
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water for a purpose that the state has not recognized as
contributing to human well-being.

In the case of abandonment,

anyone who has failed to use his water over an extended period
might be said to have established by his behavior that his use
cannot be making much contribution to public well-being, so
that the public interest requires its termination.

In the

case of return flow, it will be argued that allowing the owner
to veto uses of his return flow would lead simply to waste of
water.9
All of these arguments, however, are simply the assertion
of an implicit premise that the market is not well enough
developed to put adequate pressure on people either to use
their water efficiently, or to sell it to one who can.

So

long as the market enables those with good ideas for the use
of water to bid it away from current owners, there is no
reason to believe that any of these doctrines is needed to
assure efficient water use.
I would submit that this gloomy premise about the water
rights market,

if now true, can be changed.

The section below

addresses the criteria that must be met if water rights are to
be transferable enough so that the market can discipline those
inclined to waste.

9
A further argument would be that any other rule would
allow the development of monopoly conditions.
That seems to
me most implausible, except insofar as instream uses are
concerned.
In an watershed where little water has been
committed to consumptive use, appropriation by merely
asserting an instream use might well lead to monopoly.
The
problem is treated separately in Part B.

12

3 . Water rights meet the above test of ready
transferab i l i t y if
a . administrative/adjudicative costs are kept low;
b . water rights are cle a r l y defined;
c . tra n s f e r i s restrict e d o n l y i n t h e inter e s t of
p rotecting junior appropriators; and
d . the adjustments made in the interest of
protecting j u n i o r s a r e t h e m i n i m u m consisten t w i t h that
protection.
Below I will review each of the four subparts of
these conditions for adequate transferability.
a. A dministrative/adjudicative c o s t s a r e k e p t low.
Clyde Martz has addressed this point.

At least to an

outsider, his argument that transfers could be eased by
greater reliance on the administrative process seems
persuasive.
b. W a t e r r i g h t s a r e c l e a r l y defined.

Each of the

doctrines that I discussed in the first part of this paper
tends to undermine the clear definition of water rights.

The

concept of beneficial use, for example, means that the vendor
and vendee of water rights will, at least in some cases, be
uncertain whether the would-be transferor has any right to
transfer.
market.

Again,

let me draw the contrast to the urban land

If A owns a tract that he has used only as a parking

lot for 15 years, he can clearly sell the area to which he
initially acquired title, without anxiety that his use in that
period may be deemed not "beneficial” and thus expose him to a
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claim that he had abandoned his right.

Nor will the quantity

available for sale be reduced on the ground that his "historic
use" was less than his paper title.

But Colorado water law

creates precisely such gaps between paper title and legally
transferable right.
c. Transfer.is.restricted only in.the.interest of
prote c t i n g junior appropriators.

On this point, Colorado law

conforms to the principles I’ve set out.
states —

Wyoming comes to mind —

Unlike some other

Colorado does not mandate

an open-ended inquiry into whether the transfer serves the
public interest.

In my judgment, that is entirely correct.

Any broadening of the inquiry would increase the risk of
disapproval;

anything that increases the risk of disapproval

makes the owner’s expectation of revenues from a sale more
iffy; and anything that makes that expectation more iffy will
dull the market’s incentives.
Let me change my earlier hypo a little.

Suppose the

device costs $15,000, so that the net saving is only $5000.
And suppose in the "review" process, a proposal of transfer
has only a 50-50 chance of passing.

At that point the

prospect of an offer of $20,000 has a value of only $10,000
(after w e ’ve adjusted for the chance of defeat).10

(I am

putting aside the out-of-pocket costs of the review process,
covered in the first point above.)

Any comparable broadening

10 This oversimplifies.
Unless the review agency or
court is hopelesly erratic, it should be possible to identify
transfers with a good chance of passing, etc.
For the
sentence in the text to be accruate, then, it must refer to a
particular type of potential transfer with a 50-50 chance of
getting through the review agency or court.
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of the inquiry that accompanies transfer will have a similarly
dulling effect of waste-reduction incentives.
Although Colorado does not obstruct transfers except in
the name of protecting juniors,

federal law does so.

owner of a Bureau of Reclamation irrigation right,
to sell the right to an industrial water user,
to enjoy the full capital gain.

The

intending

is not allowed

The Bureau conditions

approval of transfer on its recapturing a substantial portion
of the original subsidy.11

The principle appears to be that a

person should not profit unduly from transferring to industry
a water right that was initially established because of a
national program in favor of agriculture.

I understand the

principle, but let me state what is involved in a slightly
different way.
wasted —

The rule requires that a valuable resource be

i.e., held below its most valuable use —

merely

because a private person would enjoy an unintended gain as a
consequence.
The country has already been through this issue in
relation to capital gains.

Because of a hostility to

incidental profits, Congress gradually pushed the effective
rate up to nearly 50% in the mid-1970s.

By 1978, however,

it

recognized the deleterious effects for the country as a whole
—

the recognition was completely bipartisan —

and sharply

11 See National Water Commission, Water Policies for the
Future 264-68 ((1973), for a review of Bureau of Reclamation
policies and recommendations for diminishing the subsidy
recapture burden.
S e e also Ellis & duMars, T h e Two-T iered
Wetsern Water Market, 57 Neb . L. Rev. 333, 335-49 (1978)
(reviewing federal discretionary power over transfers of
project water).

15

reduced rates.

The Bureau of Reclamation recapture rules

amount to a surtax on the capital gains derived from transfer
of such a right; that surtax should be abolished.
My guess is that our representatives in Congress could
free up far more water for Colorado if they took half the
energy that they lavish on water projects and instead devoted
it to the repeal of these rules.
d . The adjustments made in the interest of protecting
junio r s ar e the minimum consistent with that protection.
Here, I think, Colorado law could enjoy some improvement.
It is standard that an appropriator does not have a
property right in his return flow.

He could not, for example,

obtain an injunction against a downstream junior on the ground
that, without the return flow from his use, the junior would
have no water.
Adequate transferability of water seems to me to require
modification of that concept in the context of water
transfers.

When transfer occurs, the new right (or newly

reconstituted right) should,

I submit, be defined so that the

owner has a property right in any return flow that would
otherwise be a windfall to downstream users.
Let me illustrate.

Suppose that A has a right to divert

10 cfs and his use is 50% consumptive.
transfer the right downstream.

He proposes to

Suppose it is determined that,

in order to protect juniors located between the two points of
diversion,

the water right must be cut in half, say from 10
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cfs to 5 cfs.

Further suppose that the new use is also 50%

consumptive.
Juniors downstream of the new use will, under current
law, enjoy a windfall.
consumptive,

As the new use might have been 100%

they are getting extra security for their rights

in the form of the 2.5 cfs that the transferor could have used
himself, but doesn’t.
This transfer is effectively taxed at a rate of 50%, when
the law reduces the right from 10 to 5 cfs.

Enabling the

owner to enjoy a property right in the return flow —
his action has conferred upon downstream juniors —
offset that penalty.

which
would

It would thus reduce the negative

effects on transferability that flow from the protection of
juniors.12
The standard objection will be made that this would allow
the transferring party to be a "dog in the manger."

It does

so no more so than does allowing people to own parking lots in
Denver.

If A owns a parking lot, and B has the idea that he

could put the land to a better use, and therefore starts
building on it, we don’t say to A:

"Oh well, you weren’t

12 See L.M. Hartman & D. Seastone, Water Transfers:
Economic Efficiency & Alternative Institutions 10-11 (1970),
for advocacy of this solution.
A more radical concept would be a rule that all
appropriators have a property right in their return flow.
Under such a rule it would be a rare case where juniors’
rights would be adversely affected by a transfer.
(This puts
aside persons using the water as a result of transactions with
the appropriator whose return flow was involved and who could
be expected to protect themselves by contract with their
vendor or lessor.)
Institution of such a system at this date
is clearly impossible because of the massive restructuring of
rights that it would entail.
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using it adequately, so w e ’ll let B go ahead.”
B ’s intrusion.

That is to say, we force B to use a market

transaction to convince A —
him.

We let A veto

i.e., to bid the land away from

The same principle should, I submit, apply to water that

is a windfall to downstream juniors as a result of a transfer.
If he thinks he has a valuable use, let him bid for the water
from the owner of the transferred right.

In the absence of

monopoly, and with the costs of transfer modest, the risk of
waste should be minimal.
While this proposal may seem extreme, it in fact already
applies in the limited area of water imported from another
basin.

In that instance, the importer is regarded as owning

the return flow from his use.13
In the absence of a water market, direct government
action to monitor and prohibit waste is doomed.

It will

generate antagonism between farmers and the enforcement
agency, prolonged and expensive proceedings before agency and
court; only on very rare occasions,

in instances of extreme

waste, would it actually save any water.

With a reasonably

functional water transfer market, no such direct governmental
action would be necessary.

Water users, with an eye to resale

of any water savings, would adopt economical water saving
devices on their own.
Enhancement of the water market in Colorado is a project
that can unite adherents of the free market, typically located
on the "right,” and environmentalists,

typically located on

13
City & County of Denver v. Fulton Irr. Ditch Co., 50
P. 2d 144 (Colo. 1972).
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the left.

Speaking of water transfer markets,

the recent EDF

Report argues:
Those who hold water rights could generate extra income
by selling some water, and the water buyers could
purchase water at prices lower than the costs of newly
developed water supplies.

Pressures to divert additional

water from natural ecosystems would be reduced,

thus

benefitting the environment.14
Enhancement of the water transfer market establishes a
game in which everyone can win.

B . Instream Uses
Instream uses have at best fitted awkwardly into the
scheme of prior appropriation.

Some of the difficulties have

seemed doctrinal, but there are also some practical
difficulties in fitting instream uses efficiently into the law
of prior appropriation.
First I wish to put aside altogether the idea that
instream uses are in some way inherently inferior or, as they
have been found in some jurisdictions, non-beneficial.
Governor Lamm has rightly pointed out the enormous
contribution that instream uses make to the economy of the
state, attracting fishermen and other vacationers from less
attractive states.

But surely we need not base the beneficial

character of instream uses on its revenue potential.
not a dollar changed hands, clearly —
14

Even if

at least it is clear to

EDF Report, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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me —

the aesthetic contribution of water,

left alone in the

stream, justifies its recognition as beneficial.

Water in a

stream, smooth or rippling or cascading over rocks, sunlight
reflecting from the water, the light patterns on nearby trees
—

all these are among the things that make life worth living.

As did one of Shakespeare’s characters, celebrating life
outside of worldly competition, we can find "books in the
running brooks... and good in everything.”15
Despite the (to me) unquestioned value of water untouched
by dam builders, there are real problems in assuring that the
provision of instream uses does not end up radically
distorting the total system for allocating water.
uses have their opportunity costs too.

Instream

We should strive for a

system in which water shifts out of instream uses when the
cost exceeds its true value and into instream use when the
opposite is true.
monopoly;

I see three main problems:

(2) so-called free rider problems;

(1) risks of
and (3) assuring

that holders of instream rights are exposed to the opportunity
costs of continued instream use.
Monopoly.

Historically, the diversion requirement has

blocked establishment of instream rights in private persons
(and, in some cases, even in public entities).16

In a

watershed where much of the water is unappropriated,

the

15 W. Shakespeare, As You Like It, II, 1, 16-17.
The
full passage is:
And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything.
16 Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Rocky
Mountain Power Co, 158 Colo. 136, 406 P. 2d 798 (1965).
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application of that rule tends to prevent the monopoly which
would result from application of the other aspects of prior
appropriation law (assuming instream uses were recognized as
beneficial).17

If appropriation without diversion were valid

at that stage, application of standard prior appropriation
doctrine (i.e., treating commitment to a beneficial use as
sufficient to establish a right) would allow a sharp operator
to acquire an instream right to all the then unappropriated
flow.
Consequently, until a stream is largely appropriated (and
assuming continued reliance on prior appropriation as the
besic device for initial allocation of water rights),
permitting appropriation by private persons under the usual
rules would be problematic.

Restricting appropriation for

instream purposes to government entities makes some sense, on
the principle that such an entity would not seek a monopoly.
However,

one would want to be sure either that its membership

was truly representative or, perhaps,
final only on legislative approval.

that its acts became
Alternatively,

one might

allow private persons to appropriate for instream uses,
subject to veto by a government review board.

Presumably such

a review board would look with special favor on appropriations
by organizations permanently committed to instream recreation

17
Allocating rights initially by an auction rather t
by a user’s application to use would help circumvent this.
See Williams, T h e Requiremen t o f Ben e f i c i a l U s e a s a Cause of
Waste in Water Resource Development, 23 Nat. Res. J. 7, 20
(1983)..................... ..........
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or to preservation of nature generally (such as Trout
Unlimited or The Nature Conservancy).
Fr e e riders.

An instream use is likely to be enjoyed by

individuals that the private owner of an instream right could
not charge.

To take the most obvious case, where a road or

public park borders a stream, people can stop to fish or
picnic or just watch the water.

Many of those people would

doubtless be willing to pay for the use, if the owner of the
instream right could fence it and collect a fee.

But in many

instances the cost of fencing would be prohibitive in relation
to the possible fee, and fencing might be undermined by access
through public land.
Thus people would be able to get a "free ride" on the
owner’s rights.

A well-accepted economic principle is that

where such free-rider problems exist, the market is likely to
undersupply the good in question.

As entrepreneurs are unable

to collect the equivalent of full market prices for the good,
they will not supply it as amply as a good that is not subject
to such free rides.
Thus, while the monopoly issue would (at least for a
largely unappropriated stream) lead to excessive commitment of
water to instream uses, the free rider problem would lead to
the opposite direction.
There are various solutions here.

First, people

contribute voluntarily to organizations that preserve nature.
Those contributions —

an implicit private sector recognition
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of the free rider problem —

provide an offset at least to a

degree.
Second, government can provide a subsidy.

It already

does so by allowing tax deductibility for charitable
contributions since nature preservation is clearly among the
permissibile charitable purposes.
increased,

But that subsidy could be

for example, by providing matching grants to

organizations that acquired instream rights for public or
semi-public use.
Third, government agencies could themselves acquire
instream rights.

As noted above,

that is a potential solution

to the problem of monopoly that would arise if private
organizations were allowed to appropriate for instream
purposes when a stream was largely unappropriated.
of course,

This is,

the primary solution in the prior appropriation

states.18
Undervalu e d opportunit y costs .

Instream uses limit

possible diversions that are upstream of the point on the
river where the instream use comes to an end.
upstream transfers of pre-existing uses.)

(This includes

A government agency

charged with holding instream use rights is not likely to be
very sensitive to these opportunity costs.

No matter how

excellent the water transfer market may work in general, such
a body will be extremely reluctant ever to relinquish,
diminish,

an instream use right.

or

Yet the value realized by

18 See generally Tarlock, Appropriation f o r Instream
Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on "New" Public Western
Water Rights, 1978 Utah
L .
R e v .
2 1 1 .
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the shift of a use upstream is bound sometimes to exceed the
value of the diminution in the instream use right.
A private organization dedicated generally to preserving
nature—

The Nature Conservancy, the Audubon Society, etc. —

seems far more likely to be responsive to bids from competing
users.

It will typically enjoy a broad mandate in the general

area of nature preservation, so that it will recognize the
alternative uses of the revenue that partial relinquishments
may yield.

A concommitant will be budget flexibility

typically lacking in a state agency.
Perhaps the most well known example of this is the
Audubon Society’s oil and gas leasing in the Rainey Preserve
in Louisiana.

The Society, comparing the potential revenue

from oil and gas operations (conducted under severe and
precise restraints), and the good it could accomplish with
that revenue, with the relatively minor sacrifice of
environmental quality at the preserve itself, found the
transaction to be an overall benefit to its mission.19
Such flexibility seems almost unimaginable in a
government agency.

A transaction of that sort would be hailed

as a "sell-uot" by the agency’s constituency;

it would

probably have to turn the revenue back to the state treasury;
its personnel would be demoralized by the shrinkage of the
agency’s turf.
Solutions.

The above analysis suggests that the rule

against appropriations by private persons for instream uses
19
J. Baden & R. Stroup, Saving the Wilderness —
Radical Proposal, 13 Reason No. 3, pp. 28-36 (July 1981).

A
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requires modification.

A tentative proposal for a legal

regime for instream use would be roughly as follows:
o For initiation of rights, private charitable
organizations dedicated to nature preservation should be
allowed to make initial appropriations, subject to veto by a
fairly representative government agency.

This rule largely

solves the risk of monopoly, while opening the door to
instream holdings by non-state parties.
o Private persons should be free to acquire non-instream
rights and convert them to instream flow purposes,

as such a

conmversion entails no serious risk of monopoly.
o Subsidies for acquisition of instream rights by private
charities are suitable as a response to the free rider
problem, particularly in the form of matching grants or tax
credits or deductions.
o In general, holdings by private charitable
organizations should be preferred to state holdings, because
of their greater responsiveness to opportunity costs.

Such

organizations, so long as they fit a pre-defined class of
entities committed to nature preservation,

should be free to

sell rights as well as acquire them, and to accept cash or
other consideration in exchange for reductions in rights when
those reductions are needed to allow upstream transfers of
consumptive uses.
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C . Nontributary Groundwater
The criteria discussed in Part A are applicable to
nontributary groundwater.
differences, however:

There are three significant

(1) the physical interaction between

users is somewhat different;

(2 ) exhaustion is possible (and,

I would argue, in many cases desirable);

and (3) groundwater

law is not bedevilled by a century of the Rule of Capture.
The third point is perhaps most criticial.

For surface

water law, escape from the Rule of Capture is a virtual
impossibility.

But for nontributary groundwater, the field is

open.
I am startled that the Rule of Capture should even be a
serious candidate for a nonrenewable fugacious resource.

For

125 years, the story of oil and gas law has been the struggle
to undo its ill effects.

To use it as the starting point for

a law on nontributary underground water seems to me to
disregard that history.
The defects of the Rule of Capture are well known.
Essentially it generates a race to extract.

Putting aside

some technicalities that are special to oil and gas, that race
generates two costs:

First, it is likely to lead to an

excessive number of wells, as owners seek to get the oil or
gas out before fellow owners can.

Second, and again for the

same reason, owners extract at too fast a rate:

that is, they

disregard the value that the oil or gas may have in the
future.

They do so for the very good reason that each owner

has no assurance of being able to get it in the future —

he
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may lose it to others if he fails to extract.

While private

property rights normally give an owner an incentive to
conserve for the future,

in order to maximimize the present

value of the property,20 the uncorrected Rule of Capture
obliterates that incentive.
When I say that the Rule of Capture remains a candidate
for nontributary groundwater,

I should say explicitly that I

refer to the proposals of "Subgroup #2" of the Governor’s
Groundwater Legislation Committee.

It is, however,

inaccurate

to refer to their proposals as simply a Rule of Capture.
First, under their proposals,

land ownership would not operate

at all to limit potential extractors.

Thus, one of the

elements that limits the race to extract in oil and gas would
be absent.
Second,

in order to control the race to extract,

the

Subgroup #2 proposals would provide for very broad
bureaucratic discretion.
Groundwater Commission,

The state engineer,

a revised

and local management authorities

would, between them, determine the number and location of
wells and the rate of extraction.

The general idea is that

waste-prevention must occur entirely through direct
governmen ta l action.
be different,

the premise that merely occupies the periphery

of surface water law —

20

Thus, although the doctrinal basis would

the assumption that the market cannot

This is addressed in more detail below.

27

impose adequate constraints on neglectful water users21 —
would become central to nontributary groundwater.
Subgroup #2 dealt in harsh terms with the proposition
that overlying ownership should determine the right to extract
and that overlying owners should have an indefeasible right —
i.e., a right that others cannot destroy by going ahead with
extraction.

Let me briefly consider the Report’s criticisms

of overlying ownership:
1. The Report argues that the overlying ownership
criterion is "[1] arbitrary,
reservoir development,

[2 ] nonresponsive to optimum

[3] inflexible where flexibility may be

needed for optimum water use and [4] possibly unreliable where
acquifers may have significant tributary characteristics."
(Report of Subgroup #2, July 24, 1984 ["Subgroup #2 Report"],
p. 4.)

(The characterizations are also applied to the

statutory 100-year minimum life rule; as applied to that rule,
they seem correct.)
All these statements [at least the first three] could be
made about land ownership.

What provides the flexibility, the

responsiveness to optimum use, and the non-arbitrariness,
the capacity of owners to make transfers.

is

Those attributes

can and should apply to water rights based originally on
overlying ownership.
Basing rights on overlying ownership should, however, be
only the starting point.

Even with such ownership, owners

21
See Part A and its discussion of the doctrines of
beneficial use, abandonment, and non-ownership of return
flows, at pp. 10-11 above.
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would have an incentive to drill early in order to extract
their share before extensive drilling had lowered the water
level.

Accordingly, a system of unitization,

the one for oil and gas, should be adopted.
should be made easy:

comparable to
Unitization

agreement of, say, owners of

of the

water should be enough for adoption of a unitization agreement
binding the entire acquifer,

and, except for administrative

review to be sure that the agreement does not inflict serious
unfairness on opposing owners, no other requirement should
exist.

(By contrast, many oil-and-gas unitization statutes

condition compulsory unitization on, for example,

its being

necessary for secondary or tertiary recovery operations.

No

extraneous limitations of this sort should be imposed.)
By virtue of unitization,

(1) owners can agree on a plan

that is responsive to market forces but does not involve any
race to extract;

and (2 ) enjoyment of the beneficial interest

can rest upon a combination of overlying ownership plus
contribution to the expenses of extraction,
accidents of well location.

rather than on

Such a regime should be available

for groundwater.
2.

The Report argues that under a rule of overlying

ownership "no basis exists..., outside of a designated
groundwater basin,

for exercising conservation authority with

respect to depletable sources of supply" or for "establishing
local management districts to make value judgments on the best
utilization and conservation of the resource."
Report, p. 5.)

(Subgroup #2
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Again, the Report assumes that a system of private
property rights cannot induce appropriate conservation.
such rights —

But

if clearly defined, fully transferable, and not

subject to major externalities —
to conservation.

provide an ample incentive

If an individual owns a resource, he bears

the opportunity cost of accelerating its extraction.

If

defering extraction will increase its present value, which
will be true for many supplies if scarcity is expected to
increase, the profit motive will persuade him to do so.22
(That is the reason why, for example, in the event of a freeze
destroying much of the coffee crop, coffee owners withhold
substantial quantities from the current market;

they thereby

shift coffee supply into the future and balance available
supplies between current and future use.)
Now if the "local management district" referred to were
simply an owners’ committee, with representation proportional
to water ownership,

it would be at least analogous to a

unitization agreement.

Since Subgroup #2 rejects the

ownership concept, however, that clearly is not the basis of
22
It pays to defer extraction of an underground
resource if the value of the resource in the ground is rising
at a rate exceeding the interest rate.
In practice this means
that expensive-to-extract reserves are deferred, cheap-toextract ones are taken early.
While this may seem an
imposition on future generations, they would not be better off
if society artificially held back from consumption of the
reserves:
if their in-ground value is rising more slowly than
the interest rate, then the investments that society is in
fact making are increasing the wealth available 10, 20 or 100
years from now more rapidly than would tighter conservation of
the in-ground natural resource.
(This of course assumes that
the legal regime is not a Rule of Capture, which artificially
accelerates withdrawal.)
For an extended discussion of these
matters, see Williams, R u n n i n g Out: T h e Pro b l e m o f Exhaustible
Resources, 8 J. of Legal Stud. 165 (1978).
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the proposal.

Accordingly,

it seems to me that not having

"value judgments" made by such a committee is entirely
desirable.

In the absence of a serious market failure,

there

is no call for a committee to decide on the use of other
people’s property.23
3.

The Report argues that under the ownership concept

"the landowner gets unprecedented and unearned bonus for water
development.

The owner of land, as in the oil and gas

setting, may control access to be sure; but he cannot claim
economic benefit from the lawful removal of resources from
under his land.

The rule of capture should apply to water as

to oil and gas to the extent to which the user can put the
resource to a beneficial use."
First,

(Subgroup #2 Report, pp. 6-7.)

there is obviously nothing unprecedented about a

landowner receiving an economic benefit from resources under
his land, even though he made no contribution to their
existence.

This is exactly what the legal system for oil and

gas involves, when you combine the common law with
wellspacing,

allowables,

and unitization.

Nor it is

unprecedented for water , for the old English Rule of Capture
limits extraction to overlying owners (or persons acting with
their consent).

And clearly since adoption of Senate Bill 213

in 1973 [C.R.S. 37-90-137(4)J, effectively giving overlying
owners a veto with respect to the water under their land in an
undesignated basin,

it has had a precedent in Colorado.

23
Subgroup #2 would in effect generate a very seriou
market failure, by establishing a Rule of Capture, and then
bring in the bureaucrats to correct it.
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Second, as to the "unearned" character of the bonus, the
plain fact is that any natural resource generates unearned
wealth.

Economists refer to this value as "economic rent" —

the difference between the price necessary to elicit
production of a good and the price that the good can command
in the market.

Thus if water can be extracted at a cost of

$.25 per acre foot and has a market value of $1 per acre foot,
it has an economic rent of $.75.

Whoever gets that economic

rent, it is unearned.
For reasons that are not apparent, Subgroup #2 would
allocate that rent to those who get their proposals past the
state engineer (and other controlling bureaucracies).

Such a

rule, effectively empowering the state engineer to dole out
the economic rent, sets off a competition for that value.

In

the course of the resulting conmpetition, much of the value of
the rent is likely to be to be destroyed.

People have an

incentive to invest large sums of money hiring lawyers and
hydrologists to make their case before the deciding
bureaucrat;

they will tend to do so up to the point where

those expenses equal the expected value of the rent (i.e., its
value discounted by the likelihood of prevailing).24
Putting the economic rent up for grabs —
a state official the power to allocate it —
colossal waste.

that is, giving
generates

This is quite apart from the waste that is

24
I.e., suppose that the value of the resource is
$100,000 and a claimant estimates his chances as one-in-ten.
He will incline to spend as much as $10,000 trying to persuade
the agency to allocate the resource to him.
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likely to result from the official’s making erroneous
decisions.
Thus, denying the overlying owner the economic rent, or
as Subgroup #2 puts it, the "unearned bonus," leads to
destruction of that "bonus.”

It seems to me far superior that

it should go to the overlying owner (what’s so terrible about
him, anyway?) than be destroyed.
Accordingly,

a suitable regime for nontributary

groundwater is ownership in the overlying owner, coupled with
provisions facilitating unitization of the acquifer,
or in part.

in whole

